Interactive Tool
Canada spends 1.3% of GDP on defense — below the NATO target, below most European allies, and far below what it would take to credibly defend our own Arctic. Here’s the full picture.
The gap at a glance
Four numbers that show where Canada's military stands today.
Defense spending
1.37%
of GDP
NATO target: 2.0%
Shortfall: ~$20B/year
Regular force strength
~66K
actual vs 71.5K authorized
Shortfall: ~8,500 troops
Losing more than recruiting
Ground-based air defense
0
systems
Zero armed drones
Ukraine proved both essential
Operational submarines
1–2
of 4 Victoria-class
Can't go under Arctic ice
One caught fire on delivery
Canada’s defense budget is approximately $35 billion/year (1.37% of GDP). Reaching the NATO 2% target would require spending ~$55 billion — an additional $20 billion per year.
NATO spending comparison
Defense spending as % of GDP, 2024. The NATO 2% target is shown as a dashed line. Hover a bar for details.
Bottom of the alliance: Canada ranks 10th–12th among NATO members. Even Germany — which had neglected its military for decades and was shocked into action by Russia’s 2022 invasion — has now reached 2.1%.
Where the money goes
An extra $20 billion per year would transform Canada’s military. Toggle to see the difference.
Current budget
~$35B
1.37% of GDP
At NATO target
~$55B
2.0% of GDP (+$20B)
Current allocation: At $35B, the entire budget is consumed by baseline personnel, operations, maintenance, and capital — leaving nothing for the shortfalls in recruitment, readiness, Arctic presence, or modern equipment.
Personnel & Pay
Underpaid relative to civilian market. Private starts at ~$38K/yr.
Operations & Maintenance
Aging equipment drives up maintenance costs with declining readiness.
Capital (Equipment)
Procurement delays and overruns eat into real capability gains.
Infrastructure
Base housing unaffordable; facilities aging across the country.
The recruitment crisis
The Canadian Armed Forces are in a recruitment death spiral. Starting pay is below Amazon warehouses. Enlistment takes up to a year. And housing near bases is unaffordable.
Starting pay — private vs. civilian
Full benefits, predictable hours
Flexible shifts, sign-up bonuses
Management track, no deployment risk
6-12 month enlistment + deployment risk
Enlistment time
6–12 mo.
Canada (actual)
6–8 wks
Allied target
Candidates accept other jobs while waiting. Most walk away before they’re sworn in.
Attrition vs. recruitment
Net negative
More members leaving than joining
CAF lost ~8,500 troops from authorized strength. At current trends, the force contracts further every year.
Base housing crisis
Unaffordable
Near Victoria, Ottawa, Halifax — all military-heavy cities with extreme housing costs. A private earning $38K can’t rent a 1-bedroom near their base.
Cultural damage
Leadership scandal
Sexual misconduct allegations against multiple Chiefs of Defence Staff damaged recruitment of women and public trust. CAF culture reforms are ongoing.
Arctic sovereignty
The Northwest Passage is becoming navigable. Russia and China are building presence. Canada’s primary Arctic force is 5,000 part-time Rangers — most with snowmobiles.
Russia — Arctic military buildup
40+
Arctic military bases
6
Arctic brigades
14
operational icebreakers
2021
Arctic strategy enacted
Russia has rebuilt its Arctic military infrastructure since 2014, including nuclear-capable missile systems and a new generation of nuclear icebreakers.
China — “Near-Arctic State” ambitions
2018
"near-Arctic state" declared
2
polar research icebreakers
active
Northwest Passage surveys
growing
Arctic investment
China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” funds Arctic research infrastructure, and is surveying Canadian waters. Beijing views the Northwest Passage as a future commercial route.
Canada — Rangers with snowmobiles
5,000
Arctic Rangers (part-time)
0
permanent Arctic bases
1
aging heavy icebreaker
0
sub-ice submarines
Canada’s most recent Arctic military post (CFS Alert) is a signals intelligence station. There is no permanent combat-capable force above the 60th parallel.
The Northwest Passage problem
Canada asserts the Northwest Passage is internal waters (like a river through our territory). The United States and others claim it’s an international strait open to all shipping. As Arctic ice melts, this dispute becomes commercially critical — and Canada has no credible enforcement capability to back its claim.
Equipment report card
Every major capability category assessed against modern requirements.
Fighter Jets
At RiskCF-18s from the 1980s
F-35 replacement not until early 2030s — a decade of political indecision cost readiness.
Submarines
Critical4 Victoria-class, 1–2 operational
British hand-me-downs bought in 1998. Cannot operate under Arctic ice. One caught fire on delivery.
Air Defense
CriticalZero ground-based systems
Ukraine proved air defense is the #1 priority in modern warfare. Canada has none.
Armed Drones
CriticalZero
Proven decisive in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Middle East. Canada has not ordered any.
Icebreakers
At RiskAging fleet — need 6–8 heavy
CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent dates to 1969. Arctic shipping lanes opening; enforcement capacity nil.
Cyber Capability
CriticalNo offensive capability
Canada has a defensive cyber center (CSE) but zero offensive cyber deterrence.
Ammunition Stocks
CriticalDays to weeks of supply
NATO standard is 30+ days. Canada reportedly holds a fraction of that for high-intensity conflict.
5
Critical gaps
2
At risk
0
Adequate
The procurement problem
Canada doesn’t just underinvest in defense — it spectacularly mismanages what it does invest. A pattern of political interference, industrial policy, and procurement dysfunction.
National Shipbuilding Strategy
$60–90BCould be built for a fraction of the cost in South Korea or Germany. Domestic preference adds billions.
ArriveCAN App
$54K → $54MA simple mobile form. Should have cost $54,000. Final cost: $54 million — a 1,000× overrun with no accountability.
F-35 Fighter Decision
10+ yearsCanada began evaluating F-35s in 2010. Political interference caused a decade of delay, costing readiness and money.
Cyclone Helicopters
$5.4B, 13 years lateOrdered in 1998, delivered 2015. Canada was flying Cold War-era Sea Kings until helicopters arrived — 13 years after contract.
What would fix procurement
Establish a standalone Defense Procurement Agency — removed from political interference, staffed with commercial expertise.
Off-the-shelf by default — proven equipment from allied nations; no Canadian "uniqueness" requirements that inflate cost by 40%+.
Fixed-price contracts with performance penalties — no more cost-plus arrangements that reward overruns.
12-month procurement target for standard equipment — years-long evaluations are a capability gap in themselves.
Reform roadmap
A decade-long plan starting with people and readiness, building to full Arctic sovereignty.
Year 1
1.5% GDP targetYear 2
1.6% GDP targetYear 3
1.7% GDP targetYear 5
2.0% GDP targetYear 10
2.0%+ GDP targetShare this
“Canada spends 1.37% of GDP on defense. Russia has 40+ Arctic military bases. Canada has Rangers with snowmobiles. We claim the Northwest Passage but can’t enforce it.”
onthinice.ca/tools/defense
Sources: NATO Annual Defense Expenditure Data (2024); Department of National Defence — Defence Policy Update “Our North, Strong and Free” (2024); Parliamentary Budget Officer — Costing of DND Plans (2024); Office of the Auditor General of Canada — ArriveCAN report (2024); Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (2023); DND Force Posture Reports; SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2024); Media reporting (Globe and Mail, CBC, National Post) on CAF recruitment, equipment status, and procurement failures. All figures are approximate for FY 2024–25 unless otherwise noted.